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Summary 1 
1- A mutualism is a mutually beneficial interaction between individuals of two  2 
species. Using the ongoing debate about plant-herbivore interactions as a springboard, 3 
we show that different measures of benefit arise depending on whether adaptation 4 
within the mutualism is considered. 5 
2- A species’ proximate response measures the short-term effect of addition or 6 
removal of the partner species, without allowing for any adaptation. We define a 7 
proximate mutualism as an interaction in which removal of each partner results in a 8 
decreased performance of the other, i.e., both species show a positive proximate 9 
response to the presence of the partner. 10 
3- Almost all empirical studies use the proximate response criterion. However, a 11 
proximate mutualism might only reflect evolved dependence (implying that, through  12 
adaptation to the partner, a species has lost its ability to perform well without the 13 
partner). Therefore, some authors discard the proximate definition of mutualism, to 14 
prefer what we define as ultimate mutualism. 15 
4- A species’ ultimate response measures the long-term effect of adding or 16 
removing the partner species, thus allowing for the focal species to adapt to the 17 
absence or presence of its partner. We define an ultimate mutualism as an interaction 18 
in which each partner could never have performed as well without the other, even if it 19 
was adapted to the absence of the partner. In other words, a mutualism is called 20 
ultimate if both species show a positive ultimate response to the presence of the 21 
partner. Despite the conceptual attractiveness of this definition, ultimate responses are 22 
difficult to measure, rendering the notion of ultimate mutualism operationally 23 
problematic. 24 
5- Using examples from the literature, we demonstrate the counterintuitive result 25 
that even obligate mutualisms are not necessarily ultimate mutualisms.  26 
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6- Finally, we define mutualistic evolution as evolution of a trait that is costly to 1 
the bearer but beneficial to its partner in a proximate mutualism and show that,  2 
paradoxically, neither proximate nor ultimate mutualisms necessarily result in  3 
mutualistic evolution.  4 
7- We conclude that the proximate response is the only criterion for mutualism that 5 
is operational in empirical research. A possible key mechanism that can generate a 6 
benefit in such mutualisms, evolved dependence, has to be further investigated 7 
empirically and seriously taken into account in theoretical studies, if our  8 
understanding of mutualism is to evolve.  9 
8- More than a semantic case of hair splitting, our paper reveals a naive view of  10 
mutualism that needs revision. We need to recognise that in most if not all 11 
interactions now considered as mutualisms, measured benefits to at least one partner 12 
are likely to be partly or even completely the result of adaptation to the partner, 13 
leading to evolved dependence, rather than to what we would like to consider as 14 
“real” or ultimate benefits.  15 
 16 
Keywords: adaptation, coevolution, evolved dependence, mutualism,  17 
overcompensation, plant-herbivore interaction, proximate response, ultimate 18 
responseisms.  19 
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Introduction 1 
Mutualisms are widespread in nature (Boucher et al., 1982; Bronstein, 1994b; 2 
Menge, 2000; Richardson et al., 2000; Stachowicz, 2001). Although about a quarter of 3 
ecological studies are devoted to mutualism (Bronstein, 1994b), our understanding of 4 
and theoretical insights into this type of interaction are limited (Bronstein, 1994b). 5 
One factor that might critically contribute to this gap is an ambiguity in the concept of 6 
mutualism when there is, as is usual in a mutualistic interaction, adaptation to the 7 
partner species. Here we focus on an interaction in a given environment and ask how 8 
to determine whether or not it is mutualistic; of course, the same interaction might be 9 
classified differently in a different environment (conditional mutualism; see Box 1 10 
and Bronstein, 1994a). 11 
We would like to start with a short example to set the scene for our argument. Jeon 12 
(1972) witnessed the emergence of an obligate mutualism in the lab, evolving all the 13 
way from parasitism. Amoeba discoides was infected with bacteria that initially 14 
caused heavy mortality, small size, slow growth, and slow clone formation, and a high 15 
sensitivity to adverse conditions. The amoeba and the bacteria coevolved, and after 5 16 
years of infection, the adverse effects of the bacteria had disappeared. Moreover, after 17 
this coevolution, neither the amoebae nor the bacteria would survive without the 18 
other. This interaction is thus a clear example of a mutualism: since both organisms 19 
need their partner to survive, they clearly derive a benefit from their partner’s 20 
presence. However, is it possible that the amoeba would have been better off had the 21 
bacteria never been there? Does the bacterium provide a “real” benefit to the amoeba? 22 
Hence, should this interaction really be viewed as a mutualism? 23 
In the following sections, we explain and define different criteria used to test for 24 
mutualism: proximate response, ultimate response, and mutualistic evolution. We 25 
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show that there is a conflict between what is actually measured when testing for 1 
mutualism, resulting in what we call proximate mutualism, and what many of us 2 
would like a mutualism to mean, resulting in what we call ultimate mutualism. Each 3 
criterion presented here has been used previously by a number of different authors – 4 
yet these criteria have never been named, clearly defined, and properly contrasted. 5 
Filling this lacuna provides the platform for a thought-provoking discussion about 6 
what mutualism means. Several counterintuitive results will be demonstrated along 7 
the way. 8 
This study is motivated by a debate about plant-herbivore interactions. Some plants 9 
have been shown to overcompensate, in the sense that their fitness was increased by 10 
herbivore damage. The controversy in the literature that ensued from this observation 11 
tried to clarify whether such a result implies that these plants actually benefit from 12 
herbivory, so that the plant–herbivore interaction would have to be considered 13 
mutualistic. After a general presentation of the ideas underlying this debate, we 14 
discuss specific applications as well as their broader implication for other systems. 15 
We suggest that effects like overcompensation should be taken as valid evidence that 16 
herbivory benefits plants. However, the mechanism that is likely to generate this 17 
benefit, evolved dependence, requires to be further investigated empirically and to be 18 
seriously taken into account in empirical and theoretical studies, if our understanding 19 
of mutualism is to evolve. 20 
All key technical terms introduced in this study are defined in Box 1. 21 
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I. Theoretical basis 1 
Proximate mutualism 2 
Definition of proximate mutualism 3 
One classical approach to test for mutualism experimentally is to evaluate the 4 
performance of a species before and after its partner has been removed, or has been 5 
kept at low density (Bender et al., 1984; Krebs, 1985; Schoener, 1983). This 6 
comparison defines what we call the proximate response of a species to the removal 7 
of its partner, and is the defining criterion for a proximate mutualism (Figure 1 and 8 
Box 1). It is important to stress that, in this definition, the performance of the same 9 
genotype (or group thereof) is compared with and without the partner species. The 10 
proximate response might depend on the genotype considered, and, notably, on its 11 
status of adaptation to the partner (Figure 1). 12 
The proximate response criterion is used in most empirical studies of mutualisms. 13 
Bronstein (1994b), reviewing the underlying experiments, described them as follows: 14 
“mutualists were excluded or added… For example, many pollination studies 15 
examined plant success after all but a single visitor species were excluded (Herrera, 16 
1987)… Nearly all experimental studies of plant-ant protector mutualisms involved 17 
excluding the ants in order to measure their benefit to the plant (Koptur & Lawton, 18 
1988; Smiley, 1986).” Also mutualistic or parasitic effects of mycorrhizal associations 19 
or of leaf endophytes have been assessed by comparing plant proximate response, i.e., 20 
the performance of a plant genotype or population with and without these partners 21 
(Faeth & Sullivan, 2003; Klironomos, 2003). 22 
Proximate mutualism can result from evolved dependence 23 
However, an observed decrease of performance when a focal species’ partner is 24 
removed might result from the fact that the focal species was adapted to the presence 25 
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of its partner, and had thus compromised its ability to perform well in the partner’s 1 
absence. In the context of endosymbioses, such an effect has been called evolved 2 
dependence (Douglas & Smith, 1989). 3 
It is important to emphasize that evolved dependence can occur independently of 4 
whether or not an association is obligate; it is likely to happen in any type of 5 
association where there is adaptation. Evolved dependence is in principle quantifiable 6 
as the performance difference between the genotype that is adapted to the partner’s 7 
absence and the genotype that is adapted to its presence, both measured in the absence 8 
of the partner (Figure 1, Box 1). It comprises the cost of traits evolving as an 9 
adaptation to the partner’s presence, as well as the “cost” of having lost some traits 10 
that were adaptive in the absence of the partner (the latter cost appears in quotes 11 
because it only is a cost when the partner is removed). Operationally, a very rough 12 
indicator of the expected degree of mutual adaptation is the length of time that 13 
partners have been in ecological contact with each other or, alternatively, the length of 14 
time these partners have been separated. 15 
In conclusion, the proximate response of a genotype is bound to depend on its 16 
status of adaptation to the partner. A low performance when the partner is removed 17 
can occur simply because the genotype is not adapted to this situation: its low 18 
performance stems from evolved dependence. This is not the type of “real benefit” we 19 
have in mind when assessing a mutualistic interaction. 20 
Ultimate mutualism 21 
Definition of ultimate mutualism 22 
To understand whether evolved dependence is responsible for an observed 23 
proximate mutualism between two species, or whether, instead, there is a “real 24 
benefit” from the interaction, it is important to introduce a second criterion for 25 
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mutualism. Here we have to ask whether the focal species performs better than it 1 
would ever have without the other species. We thus have to consider the ultimate 2 
response of a species to its partner, measured by comparing the performance of two 3 
different genotypes (or groups thereof): the performance of the one genotype adapted 4 
to the partner, in the partner’s presence, is compared to the performance of the other 5 
genotype adapted to the absence of the partner, in the partner’s absence. This 6 
criterion, of course, is not without practical difficulties, which we will discuss in 7 
detail below. The criterion leads to defining an ultimate mutualism as an interaction in 8 
which each partner shows a positive ultimate response to the presence of the other 9 
(Figure 1, Box 1). 10 
The proximate response of a population adapted to its partner is equal to its 11 
ultimate response plus evolved dependence. Therefore, if a population derives an 12 
ultimate benefit from a partner species, it is also likely to derive a proximate benefit 13 
from this interaction. However, the reverse is not true: a population adapted to the 14 
partner that shows a proximate benefit from the interaction might derive no ultimate 15 
benefit from the association whatsoever, if evolved dependence is the only cause of 16 
the proximate benefit. 17 
The existence of evolved dependence is one reason for discrepancies between 18 
proximate and ultimate responses. Dependence of this sort is likely to be important 19 
for partners with a long history of coevolution, and we must thus expect some such 20 
interactions to be proximate but not ultimate mutualisms. 21 
Accounting for ultimate responses in the literature 22 
In studies of mutualism, a few authors adopted the ultimate response to measure 23 
the benefit of an interaction. Examples from the plant-herbivore literature are 24 
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described below in the sections “Theoretical argument for plant’s ultimate benefit” 1 
and “Measurement of plant’s ultimate responses”. 2 
Another example of an author defining mutualism based on ultimate responses is 3 
Roughgarden (1975) in a model for the evolution of a symbiosis between fish and 4 
anemones. Assuming the ancestral state of fish to be free-living, Roughgarden 5 
assessed the benefit of the symbiosis as the difference between the fitness of the free-6 
living genotype and the fitness of the symbiotic genotype with an anemone. The 7 
model assumes a strong evolved dependence in the system: when the symbiotic 8 
genotype cannot find a host anemone, or when its host anemone dies, its reproductive 9 
output is much reduced. 10 
Measurement of ultimate responses 11 
Measuring ultimate responses requires tests both on a genotype that is adapted to 12 
the presence of the partner and on a genotype that is adapted to the absence of the 13 
partner. Since there is no point in defining quantities that are not measurable in 14 
practice, the status of adaptation to the partner must be assessed pragmatically. In 15 
particular cases, it would be impossible to assess whether adaptation had reached an 16 
evolutionary endpoint; these might not even exist (Dieckmann et al., 1995; 17 
Gomulkiewicz et al., 2000; Thompson & Cunningham, 2002). However, this should 18 
not prevent evaluation of an ultimate response based on the current status of 19 
adaptation, which can be very roughly assessed based on the length of coevolutionary 20 
history experienced by the partners. Note that in this context the strength of selection 21 
imposed by a species on its partner is likely to be more important that the length of 22 
their coevolutionary history, and would be a better proxy to the status of adaptation if 23 
it could be quantified. For assessing ultimate responses, four cases can be 24 
distinguished: 25 
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• We may have access to an ancestral state that is not adapted to the partner. 1 
Performance measurements for the two genotypes under the appropriate 2 
conditions can then be undertaken. 3 
• The organism is fast evolving and viable without the partner, so that 4 
experimental adaptation to the partner’s absence can be selected for on a 5 
feasible timescale. Performance differences can then be measured as in the 6 
first case. Unfortunately, the population experimentally adapted to the 7 
partner’s absence might also inadvertently be subjected to other selective 8 
pressures, besides those arising from the partner’s absence. 9 
• Even though there may be no access to a suitable ancestral state, there may yet 10 
exist separate populations of the focal organism with histories of evolution 11 
with and without the partner. Measurements can then be carried out comparing 12 
such populations, provided that sufficient replicates exist. This is not as 13 
satisfactory a situation as in the preceding cases, because other factors are 14 
likely to co-vary with the partner’s presence or absence. 15 
• There may be no access to an ancestral state, the organism may not be viable 16 
without the partner, or, even if it is viable, its generation time may be too long 17 
for experimental adaptation to the partner’s absence to be feasible. Ultimate 18 
responses then cannot be measured. However, if there is sufficient genetic 19 
variation in the species, it may still be possible to search for genetic trade-offs 20 
between the focal species’ performance with and without the partner to 21 
establish indirect evidence for evolved dependence. 22 
Douglas and Smith (1989) discuss in detail the difficulties of measuring ultimate 23 
responses in endosymbioses. 24 
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To summarize, the concept of ultimate mutualism is very satisfactory conceptually, 1 
but in many cases might prove unrealistic in terms of measurements. Unfortunately, 2 
some authors seem to accept only this definition of mutualism and discard any 3 
alternative based on proximate responses, thus apparently overlooking the difficulties 4 
of measuring ultimate responses as well as the fact that most empirical work has only 5 
measured proximate responses. 6 
An obligate mutualism is not necessarily an ultimate mutualism 7 
We would like to draw attention to the slightly counterintuitive fact that an obligate 8 
mutualism is not necessarily an ultimate mutualism. We presented the case described 9 
by Jeon (1972) in the introduction. Amoeba discoides was infected with a parasitic 10 
bacterium. After adaptation took place, the adverse effects of the bacteria had 11 
disappeared, suggesting a neutral ultimate response of the amoebae to the bacteria. 12 
Moreover, both organisms had become dependent on the other for survival, resulting 13 
in a mutualism that was both proximate and obligate. Importantly, however, the 14 
proximate benefit derived by the amoeba from the interaction was probably due to 15 
evolved dependence: the amoeba lost traits that made it adapted to the absence of the 16 
bacteria, and there is no evidence for the interaction providing an ultimate benefit to 17 
the amoeba. 18 
Other examples involves Wolbachia, intracellular bacteria infecting a number of 19 
invertebrates. In arthropods, these bacteria are rarely found to be beneficial to their 20 
hosts and thus provide a striking example of selfish cytoplasmic elements. Despite 21 
physiological costs or even virulence, they are able to maintain themselves through 22 
induced modifications to host reproductive biology. Dedeine et al. (2001) report a 23 
case of obligate mutualism with the parasitoid wasp Asobara tabida Nees 24 
(Hymenoptera, Braconidae). Female wasps could not reproduce after removal of 25 
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Wolbachia because they could not produce mature oocytes. Dedeine et al. (2001) 1 
suggest that the wasp or its ancestor became associated with a Wolbachia that already 2 
produced a factor necessary for wasp oogenesis. The host then lost the capacity to 3 
produce this costly factor itself, thus becoming totally dependent on the bacteria for 4 
reproduction. Similar losses of function have been reported in other insect-Wolbachia 5 
interactions. For example, there are several cases in which parthenogenesis induction 6 
by Wolbachia infection can be reversed by curing the infection (Stouthamer, 1997), 7 
but in some cases the host species can no longer function successfully as a sexual 8 
taxon due to adverse changes in male and/or female traits (Arakaki et al., 2001; 9 
Gottlieb & Zchori-Fein, 2001; Hunter, 1999). Gottlieb and Zchori-Fein (2001) argue 10 
that since sexual reproduction has ceased, selection on sexual traits has been removed, 11 
leading to the disappearance of or reduction in these traits. They suggest that in 12 
symbionts that manipulate their host’s reproduction to induce parthenogenesis, the 13 
host is being captured by the bacteria for the latter’s transmission benefit, leaving no 14 
other way of reproduction for the host. These cases are clear examples of obligate 15 
proximate mutualisms, where the main benefits for the host come from evolved 16 
dependence. We suggest that these interactions are unlikely to be ultimate 17 
mutualisms, but this has not yet been tested. 18 
Even for interactions that went through a phase of ultimate mutualism it is 19 
plausible that the interaction’s ultimate costs escalate over evolutionary time. Such a 20 
development is especially likely for species that evolve an extreme dependence on 21 
their partner, and therefore cannot get out of an interaction even if its costs escalate 22 
(Pellmyr et al., 1997). As ultimate costs grow, the obligate interaction is likely to 23 
cease to be an ultimate mutualism. For example, Johnson et al. (1997) argue that 24 
plants that are highly dependent on mycorrhizae for nutrient uptake might have a 25 
de Mazancourt, Loreau and Dieckmann 
 
13
greater risk of mycorrhizal parasitism in highly fertilized systems, because they might 1 
not closely control “unnecessary” root growth or rate of colonisation. It is possible 2 
that a plant in an obligate mycorrhizal association might be “trapped” in this obligate 3 
interaction even when conditions change and the interaction no longer implies any 4 
ultimate benefit. 5 
Questions resulting from comparing proximate and ultimate responses in mutualism 6 
research 7 
So far, in empirical studies, measured costs and benefits are almost exclusively 8 
proximate (i.e., the same group of genotypes was compared with and without the 9 
partner; Bronstein, 1994b). New and interesting research directions could thus be 10 
opened up by investigating ultimate costs and benefits where possible, and by looking 11 
for genetic trade-offs between genotypes differentially adapted to a partner’s absence 12 
and presence. 13 
A very important question in mutualism research is the evolution and maintenance 14 
of mutualisms in the presence of cheaters (Bronstein, 2001; Denison et al., 2003; 15 
Ferriere et al., 2002; Freckleton & Cote, 2003; Hoeksema & Kummel, 2003; 16 
Johnstone & Bshary, 2002; Law et al., 2001; Yu, 2001). Measuring the costs induced 17 
by the presence of cheaters is essential to tackle this question, and contrasting 18 
proximate and ultimate costs might thus be a key element in advancing this line of 19 
research. For example, nectar robbers damage floral parts and take resources without 20 
effecting pollination (Inouye, 1980). Most removal experiments assess the cost of 21 
robbers on the female fitness of the plant by experimentally removing robbers, thus 22 
assessing the proximate cost of robbers’ presence. However, robbers also induce an 23 
ultimate cost that is likely to be higher than the proximate cost. Roubik et al. (1985) 24 
showed that the flowers of a tropical forest understory treelet, Quassia amara, had 25 
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lower corolla length and nectar production on an island where nectar robbers were 1 
absent. This suggests that without robbers, there is selection against these traits, so 2 
that the performance of plants adapted to robbers is suboptimal. Accordingly, evolved 3 
dependence enlarges the ultimate cost of robbers’ presence relative to the 4 
corresponding proximate cost. Measuring the evolved dependence for this system 5 
would involve comparing the performances of different plant genotypes in the 6 
presence and absence of robbers, in order to establish whether these plants show 7 
variation in their adaptation to the presence of cheaters. 8 
Evolution in a mutualism 9 
We now examine a third dimension according to which mutualisms can be 10 
assessed: the concept of mutualistic evolution is key to many discussions about 11 
mutualism. We define mutualistic evolution as evolution of investment in the partner. 12 
Such an adaptation has a direct cost to the bearer, but, other things being equal, 13 
increases the performance of both partners. It is important to realize that not all 14 
adaptations to a mutualistic partner qualify as mutualistic evolution. This is because 15 
traits may also evolve to allow better exploitation of the partner or to prevent better 16 
exploitation by the partner; in addition, certain functions may be lost evolutionarily if 17 
they are provided more efficiently by the partner (Connor, 1995). 18 
Where does the benefit of an interaction come from? 19 
For defining proximate and ultimate mutualism above, we used criteria based on 20 
the net effect of the presence of the partner (an effect-based definition; Abrams, 21 
1987), rather than descriptions of the physiological and ecological processes through 22 
which benefits are gained (a process-based definition; Abrams, 1987). For defining 23 
mutualistic evolution it is interesting to distinguish between different categories of 24 
benefit gained from an interaction. Connor (1995) classifies the benefits derived from 25 
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an interaction as (a) by-product benefits, occurring incidentally at no cost to the donor 1 
(as for two plants accidentally growing together with one taking advantage of the 2 
other’s protective thorns). Connor contrasts this with (b) purloined benefits, obtained 3 
by exploiting the partner (as a predator would), and (c) invested benefits, obtained 4 
despite a direct cost because the partner is giving something for a return. 5 
Proximate and ultimate mutualisms can result from benefits of any of these types. 6 
Several authors, however, have demanded evidence of evolution of invested benefits 7 
as demonstration that an interaction is “truly” mutualistic (Belsky et al., 1993; 8 
Agrawal, 2000). Below we argue that such evolution does not necessarily happen 9 
either in a proximate or in an ultimate mutualism, and that it can occur even towards 10 
an exploitative partner. We describe scenarios that would lead to such counterintuitive 11 
results, by considering simple cases of two interacting species coevolving in a 12 
constant environment. We note that since coevolution is often diffuse (Agrawal & 13 
Van Zandt, 2003; Inouye & Stinchcombe, 2001), theory taking into account this 14 
complexity needs to be developed (Loreau et al., 2003; Stanton, 2003) – but this 15 
cannot be the purpose of our present study. 16 
Antagonistic strategies can be selected for in mutualistic interactions 17 
A mutualistic strategy might be counter-selected in a proximate or ultimate 18 
mutualism. This is because investment in the partner is not selected for if the benefit 19 
of the interaction has to be shared with too many conspecifics, illustrating the well-20 
known fact that evolution of investment in the partner requires that “the partner must 21 
reciprocate and that the reciprocated benefit must be captured by the initial giver or its 22 
offspring” (Yu, 2001). Thus, a trait will not evolve if its beneficial effect is uniformly 23 
distributed over all conspecifics. A case in point is the evolution of fruit abortion in 24 
senita cacti or yuccas as a means of decreasing seed predation by their respective 25 
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pollinators: such adaptations will only occur if the pollinator population is localized 1 
on the individual plant (Holland & DeAngelis, 2002). If the benefit of an investment 2 
in the partner is distributed over conspecifics, there might even be selection for an 3 
antagonistic strategy, as we show below in a plant-herbivore example. 4 
Selection can favour investment into an exploiting partner 5 
A possible scenario involves evolution of a trait that benefits the bearer by 6 
protecting it against predation. For example, the majority of the estimated 6000 7 
species of Lycaenids have associations with ants that range from mutualism to 8 
parasitism (Pierce et al., 2002). A standard interpretation of the mutualistic 9 
association is that lycaenid larvae produce secretions in order to attract ants and 10 
benefit from their protection from parasitoids. However, another interpretation is 11 
possible: Malicky (1970) has suggested that lycaenid larvae might produce secretions 12 
in order to prevent predation by ants. These secretions would then be an example of 13 
an investment into an exploiting partner. 14 
 15 
II. Plant-herbivore interactions 16 
Plant proximate response to herbivore removal 17 
Experimental studies have demonstrated that, under some conditions, herbivory 18 
leads to increased plant fitness. Lifetime reproductive output (seed production of 19 
monocarpic plant species, controlling for seed weight and germination potential) was 20 
increased by grazing or cutting for some populations of Ipomopsis aggregata 21 
(Gronemeyer et al., 1997; Paige, 1992; Paige & Whitham, 1987) and Gentianella 22 
campestris (Huhta et al., 2000b; Juenger et al., 2000; Lennartsson et al., 1997, 1998). 23 
Other monocarpic species can show increased seed production following moderate 24 
cutting under field conditions (Huhta et al., 2003) or artificial conditions such as 25 
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reduced competitive pressure and/or fertilizer application (Alward & Joern, 1993; 1 
Benner, 1988; Huhta et al., 2000a). The results on Ipomopsis aggregata and 2 
Gentianella campestris thus suggest that a proximate mutualism can exist between 3 
these plants and their herbivores. 4 
Some authors (Agrawal, 2000; Vail, 1994) accept this evidence as confirmation of 5 
a possible benefit of the plant from herbivory, leading to the claim that plant-6 
herbivore mutualism may exist. 7 
Evolved dependence of plants towards their herbivores 8 
Increased seed production in overcompensating plants results from the release of 9 
apical dominance and from the production of numerous tillers (Benner, 1988; Huhta 10 
et al., 2000b; Juenger et al., 2000; Lennartsson et al., 1997, 1998; Paige, 1999; Paige 11 
& Whitham, 1987; Strauss & Agrawal, 1999). If the probability of herbivory is high, a 12 
plant that produces multiple shoots from the beginning of the season will lose them all 13 
to the herbivore (Crawley, 1987). If, however, herbivory only occurs during a short 14 
period, damage by herbivores can serve as a signal for the plant that the risk of 15 
herbivory soon will be over, and post-herbivory activation of dormant meristems is 16 
selected for (Tuomi et al., 1994b; Vail, 1992). Several models suggest that plants 17 
adapted to herbivory should have developed mechanisms for resource mobilization 18 
triggered by herbivory (Jaremo et al., 1999; Lehtila, 2000; Mathews, 1994; Nilsson et 19 
al., 1996a, 1996b; Simons & Johnston, 1999; Tuomi et al., 1994b; Vail, 1992, 1994). 20 
This adaptation leads to low reproduction in the absence of herbivory, just because 21 
this plant genotype is not adapted to a situation without herbivores, and there is a 22 
trade-off between the ability of a plant to perform with and without herbivores. In the 23 
presence of herbivores, it is advantageous to wait before allocating resources to 24 
growth. In the absence of herbivores, however, this trait is disadvantageous and plants 25 
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should instead allocate all their resources to growth as soon as possible. Mechanisms 1 
like this might explain the proximate benefit that these plants derive from herbivores. 2 
Evolved dependence has likely arisen in many plant-herbivore interactions. In 3 
Gentianella campestris, the plant’s ability to produce more seeds after herbivore 4 
damage only occurs in populations adapted to either herbivory or mowing 5 
(Lennartsson et al., 1997, 1998). Similarly, the ability to tolerate herbivory was 6 
negatively correlated with fitness in the absence of herbivory in Ipomoea purpurea 7 
(Tiffin & Rausher, 1999). 8 
Because overcompensation is likely to result from evolved dependence rather than 9 
any other mechanism of “real” benefit, some authors do not accept the proximate 10 
response of overcompensation as sufficient proof that plants might benefit from 11 
herbivory (Belsky et al., 1993; Järemo et al., 1999; Mathews, 1994; Tuomi et al., 12 
1994b). 13 
Ultimate mutualism in plant-herbivore interactions 14 
Theoretical arguments for plant-herbivore interactions causing an ultimate cost to 15 
plants 16 
Vail (1992) built a model showing that plants benefit from herbivory because 17 
plants adapted to herbivores should perform best with herbivores. However, he noted 18 
that although removal of herbivores reduces fitness in the short term, “that would 19 
simultaneously impart a selective pressure… and thus raise fitness in the long run.” 20 
Mathews (1994) criticized Vail’s interpretation: “although Vail speculates about the 21 
benefits of herbivory, his model in fact contradicts him because plant fitness is higher 22 
in the absence of herbivory than anywhere else.” For Mathews, the proximate 23 
criterion is not valid for testing benefits from herbivory: there needs to be an ultimate 24 
benefit resulting from the presence of herbivores. Also in other recent studies there 25 
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seems to be some convergence towards using the ultimate response criterion (Järemo 1 
et al., 1999; Nilsson et al., 1996a, 1996b; Simons & Johnston, 1999; Stowe et al., 2 
2000; Tuomi et al., 1994a, 1994b), and rejecting the validity of a proximal response 3 
criterion. 4 
No empirical evidence for plant-herbivore interactions causing an ultimate benefit for 5 
plants 6 
Järemo et al. (1999) measured the ultimate response of Gentianella campestris to 7 
herbivore removal. Based on existing data, they compared populations that have 8 
evolved with the herbivore to populations that have evolved without it. They found no 9 
empirical evidence for an ultimate benefit for the plant, but there was also no evidence 10 
for an ultimate cost. 11 
In a different study, the comparison of reaction norms of maternal lines of 12 
Gentianella campestris from different populations also failed to show any trade-off 13 
between fitness in the absence of herbivory and the ability to compensate for 14 
herbivory (Juenger et al., 2000). To conclude, this plant seems to show no strong 15 
ultimate response to herbivores: herbivores seem ultimately neutral. 16 
Mutualistic evolution in plant-herbivore interactions 17 
Belsky et al. (1993) define a “mutualistic plant” as a plant that “makes some 18 
portion of their bodies available to herbivores” (i.e., a plant that invests in the 19 
herbivore), whereas an “antagonistic plant” defends itself against herbivores. They 20 
argue that if the plant-herbivore interaction was a mutualism, then we should witness 21 
the evolution of mutualistic plants, implying mutualistic evolution through which a 22 
plant evolves to invest in its herbivore. However, here we argue that this is not 23 
necessarily the case. 24 
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If herbivores have a positive effect on plant fitness through the efficient recycling 1 
of nutrients (de Mazancourt et al., 2001), then plants receive a benefit from the 2 
presence of herbivores. The more efficient the herbivore is at recycling nutrients, the 3 
more benefit there is to the plant, and at high herbivore recycling efficiencies the 4 
interaction can well be a proximate or even an ultimate mutualism. However, when 5 
nutrient cycling is redistributed amongst all plants, mutualistic plants experience a 6 
direct cost and exert a positive effect on the herbivore. They do not receive a one-on-7 
one benefit, as all plants receive a benefit through the herbivore. It can be shown that 8 
the more efficient the herbivore becomes at recycling nutrients, the more selection 9 
favours defended plants, because they benefit more from nutrients recycled from less 10 
defended plants. Therefore, the more herbivores recycle, the more antagonistic plant 11 
strategies are selected for and plant defences thus go up. At the same time, 12 
nevertheless, the interaction can become a proximate and even an ultimate mutualism, 13 
as long as herbivores conserve nutrients in the system to and extent that enables plants 14 
to perform better on the whole. 15 
Although there have been many empirical studies on the effects of herbivores on 16 
nutrient cycling (Carpenter & Kitchell, 1984; Chaneton et al., 1996; Detling, 1988; 17 
Floate, 1981; Jarvis et al., 1989; Pastor & Cohen, 1997; Ritchie et al., 1998; Ruess et 18 
al., 1989; Ruess & McNaughton, 1988; Seagle et al., 1992; Wilson & Jefferies, 1996), 19 
none has yet studied the net effect of herbivory on plant fitness and the resultant 20 
selection pressure on plants. Therefore there exists no empirical indication to date that 21 
would allow us to assess how widely the scenario sketched here occurs in nature. 22 
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Conclusions 1 
So, what is a mutualism when there is adaptation to the partner? In this paper we 2 
have defined and systematically contrasted three alternative definitions of mutualism. 3 
If we need to choose only one of them, it has to be that of proximate mutualism. If we 4 
were to discard the criterion of proximate mutualism, we would abandon core 5 
evidence for most studied examples of mutualism. However, in choosing this 6 
criterion, we must acknowledge the potential importance of evolved dependence as a 7 
valid mechanism that creates a benefit resulting from the partner’s presence. In the 8 
plant-herbivore debate, this means that we have to accept evidence of 9 
overcompensation as evidence that plants indeed benefit from herbivory (provided 10 
that overcompensation occurs as a result of a realistic herbivory event), however 11 
irritating and counterintuitive this might be. More empirical and theoretical studies 12 
should take into account evolved dependence as a possibly crucial mechanism 13 
generating mutualism. 14 
Ultimate mutualism is similar to what many people would intuitively like to call 15 
mutualism, or “true” mutualism (as stated by Agrawal 2000; i.e., a mutualism that 16 
does not stem from evolved dependence). Unfortunately, the ultimate response is not 17 
even meaningful in many classical examples of mutualism. Also because of major 18 
difficulties involved in its measurement, we believe that the ultimate response will 19 
remain an abstraction that is not always useful. Moreover, even obligate mutualisms 20 
are not guaranteed to be “true” or ultimate mutualisms. 21 
The plant-herbivore controversy seemed resolved by adopting a criterion of 22 
ultimate rather than proximate benefit (Järemo et al., 1999), thus rejecting the 23 
proximate criterion of overcompensation. We contend that this is not satisfactory, as 24 
the proximate criterion cannot be rejected without serious reconsideration of most 25 
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classical examples of mutualism. Instead, we argue, we ought to recognise the 1 
potentially very important role of evolved dependence in all mutualisms. 2 
Finally, the analysis of adaptations that can bring about, maintain, or jeopardize 3 
mutualistic interactions needs to be disentangled from the criteria for mutualism itself. 4 
As we have shown, traits that favour or harm a partner might evolve in any type of 5 
interaction: hence, defining mutualism through mutualistic evolution seems of limited 6 
utility. 7 
Differentiating between the three concepts introduced here allows us to focus on 8 
new and stimulating research questions. For many interactions that are considered 9 
mutualistic it will be illuminating to evaluate empirically (a) whether there is 10 
adaptation to the presence of the partner, (b) through which route evolved dependence 11 
has been selected for, (c) how evolved dependence contributes to proximate benefits, 12 
and (d) how proximate and ultimate benefits affect the mutualistic or antagonistic 13 
evolution of traits. 14 
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Box 1: Definition of key terms 1 
Performance: To compare the performance of organisms under different conditions 2 
(with or without partners), an absolute measure of performance is required, rather than 3 
a relative one. What measure to use is not a trivial question. Possible performance 4 
measures include the following. (1) Absolute fitness of an individual, i.e., its lifetime 5 
reproductive success, always equals 1 when populations are at steady state, so that 6 
care must be taken in setting the conditions under which lifetime reproductive success 7 
is measured (as described below). Proxies of absolute fitness can sometime be used. 8 
(2) Short-term population growth rate is a good proxy of lifetime reproductive 9 
success under conditions of repeated disturbance, through which a population mostly 10 
remains in an exponential growth phase. (3) Long-term population size may be a 11 
proxy of absolute fitness for populations close to steady state. Discrepancies between 12 
the different measures are discussed in Abrams (1987) and van Baalen and Jansen 13 
(2001). 14 
Proximate response: Difference in performance of a genotype (or group thereof) 15 
before and after short-term removal (or addition) of the partner species. Note that the 16 
performance of the same genotype (or group thereof) is thus compared under two 17 
conditions, one of which it might not be adapted to. Measurement – If performance is 18 
measured as lifetime reproductive success, the focal species’ density after removal 19 
must be kept at its value before removal. We can then consider the focal population 20 
with its partner, with LRS = 1, remove the partner, and measure the new lifetime 21 
reproductive success, LRSP. The proximate response to removal is LRSP – 1. 22 
Proximate mutualism: Interspecific interaction in which removal of each partner 23 
results in a decreased performance of the other. It is characterised by negative 24 
proximate responses of each species to the removal of the other species. Such 25 
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negative proximate responses can be due to “real” or ultimate benefits, but 1 
alternatively may merely reflect evolved dependence resulting from adaptation to 2 
partner. 3 
Evolved dependence: Through adaptation to the presence of an interacting partner 4 
species, a population might lose its ability to perform well in the absence of such a 5 
partner. Evolved dependence measures the loss of performance of a focal population 6 
in the absence of a partner due to its adaptation to the presence of the partner. 7 
Measurement – If performance is measured as lifetime reproductive success, we can 8 
consider the focal population with its partner, remove the partner, and measure the 9 
new lifetime reproductive success, LRSP. We can then replace every individual in the 10 
focal population with a genotype adapted to the absence of the partner, and measure 11 
the new lifetime reproductive success, LRSU. The evolved dependence is LRSU – 12 
LRSP. 13 
Ultimate response: Difference in performance before and after “long-term” removal 14 
(or addition) of a partner species, allowing for adaptation to take place. Performance 15 
of a genotype (or group thereof) adapted to the presence of the partner is measured in 16 
the presence of the partner, and compared to the performance of a genotype (or group 17 
thereof) adapted to the absence of the partner measured in the absence of the partner. 18 
Measurement – If performance is measured as lifetime reproductive success, the focal 19 
species’ density in the presence and absence of its partner must be kept the same. We 20 
can then consider the focal population with its partner, with LRS = 1; remove the 21 
partner and replace every individual in the focal population with a genotype adapted 22 
to the absence of the partner, and measure the new lifetime reproductive success, 23 
LRSU. The ultimate response to removal is LRSU – 1. 24 
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Ultimate mutualism: Interspecific interaction in which each partner species could 1 
never have performed as well without the other, even if it was adapted to the absence 2 
of the partner. In other words, an ultimate mutulaism is characterised by negative 3 
ultimate responses of each species to the removal of the other species. 4 
Mutualistic evolution: Evolution of a trait that is costly to the bearer but beneficial to 5 
its partner in a proximate mutualism (investment in a partner sensu Connor, 1995). 6 
Note that adaptation to the partner does not necessarily imply mutualistic evolution; 7 
for example, there can be evolution of traits that allow to better exploit the partner. 8 
Obligate mutualism: Interaction in which the removal of the partner results in death 9 
or complete loss of reproduction in the focal species. The focal species has therefore a 10 
proximate benefit from the interaction, as its proximate response to partner removal is 11 
maximally negative. In many cases, the ultimate response to partner removal cannot 12 
be measured in obligate mutualisms. (Antonym: facultative mutualism). 13 
Conditional mutualism: Interspecific interaction that is mutualistic (proximately or 14 
ultimately) only under specific environmental conditions (Bronstein, 1994a). 15 
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Figure 1.  Performance of a genotype adapted to the absence of its partner (left 1 
column), a genotype adapted to the presence of its partner (right column), both in the 2 
presence of the partner (upper row), and in the absence of its partner (lower row). 3 
Differences between these four performances measure the responses discussed in the 4 
text. The proximate response of the organism to partner removal is measured for 5 
individual genotypes, as FGa/p – FGa/a for the genotype adapted to the partner, and as 6 
FGp/p – FGp/a for the genotype adapted to the absence of the partner. The ultimate 7 
response of the organism to partner removal is measured as FGp/p – FGa/a, i.e., as the 8 
difference between the performance in the presence of the partner of a genotype that 9 
evolved with the partner and the performance in the absence of the partner of a 10 
genotype that evolved without the partner. Evolved dependence is measured as the 11 
difference between the performance without the partner of a genotype that evolved 12 
without the partner and the performance without the partner of a genotype that 13 
evolved with the partner, FGa/a – FGp/a. Note that the ultimate response of a genotype 14 
adapted to the partner equals its proximate response minus the evolved dependence. 15 
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